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REMOVAL OF THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR DURING
HIS TERM OF OFFICE
Arthur H. Travers, Jr.*
The traditionalrules governing the removal of corporate
directors have evolved so as to insulate the board of directors
from the shareholders who elect them. Professor Travers in
his article examines initially the interests being advanced by
protecting the board members from removal by their electorate. He then critically analyzes the law as it relates to
these interests in order to suggest a more rational approach.
I. INTRODUCTION

Until recently the typical pattern of corporation statutes was to prescribe that shareholders should elect the corporation's directors for a
term of office set forth either in the statute itself' or in the corporation's
bylaws.2 Between elections the business and affairs of the corporation
were to be managed by that board3 The courts deduced from this
pattern that the shareholders were not to interfere with the board's
management or attempt to make policy themselves; 4 their job was to
review the performance of each director when he stood for re-election
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A., Grinnell College;
LLB., Harvard University.
ISee, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 34 (rev. ed. 1959); CAL. CoRP.
CODE A Ni.§ 805 (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 703 (McKinney 1963); TEX.
Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 2.32 (Vernon 1956). All states which fix the term by statute
prescribe one year, although many, like New York, permit classification of the
board. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANx. § 34, 2.02(5).
2E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1402 (Purdon 1967). Some states have no explicit
term of office set forth in the statute, and it is inferable that a bylaw on the
matter would be appropriate. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp.
1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
8A.1 statutes prescribe this as a basic norm of corporate government although
the provisions vary in elaborateness. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT A--.
§ 33, 1 2.02(2).
4
See, e.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912);
Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N. 85 (1880). It is interesting
to note that the English courts reached the same result without benefit of statute.

See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34
(CA.). However, some commentators believe that the rationale for the rule in
England has been removed by the provision in the Companies Act of 1948, 11 &
12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 184, which allows a majority of the shareholders to remove a
director with or without cause. See Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for
the Berkeley, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1186-87 n.35 (1955).
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and to refuse to re-elect those who had performed unsatisfactorily. It
was uncommon for statutes to contain provisions setting forth what
power the shareholders might have to remove one or more directors
before their terms expired.5
In the absence of such provisions the courts were called upon to
determine the exact extent of the shareholders' power of removal, or
"amotion" as it was sometimes called,0 and the manner in which it
might be exercised. The rules which the courts formulated, taken as
a whole, seem to make it a difficult task to oust a director before his
term expires; shareholders may not remove directors at will, but only
for legally sufficient cause.7 An intra-corporate hearing must be held8
and the director afforded certain procedural safeguards, such as notice
of the charges against him,9 an opportunity to prepare a defense, 10 and
an opportunity to present that defense before the shareholders vote on
his removal.- The director may seek judicial review of the removal
proceedings to guarantee that there were no irregularities. 12 Should
the court for any reason decide that the attempted removal is invalid,
it is empowered to restore the director to office by an appropriate
remedy.
By contrast, corporate officers and agents, even high-level executives,
are removable by the board of directors at pleasure, subject to any
SOf late there has been a trend toward a statutory provision permitting a
majority of the shareholders to remove a director or directors with or without
cause. See, e.g., MIsS. CODS AN=. § 5309-75 (Supp. 1964); NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 21-2039
(Supp. 1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.193 (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE A-m. § 12-18.7
(Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE A-m. § 16-10-37 (Supp. 1965). In part this may be due to
the fact that the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act was amended in 1955
to include an optional section, §36A, which authorized removal with or without
cause. Although this section represents a much more "shareholder-oriented"
philosophy than that evidenced by the original act, see Whats New in Corporation
Laws, 8 Bus. LAW., Jan. 1953, at 1, 27-32, at least one knowledgeable commentator
believes the provision so important that making it optional is a mistake. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection,
23 LAW & CONTElP. PROB. 193, 203 (1958).
6 See, e.g., J. KENT, ConmrENTAmis *298; J. ANGEL. & S. AmES, PRiVATE CORPORATIONs 411-12 (7th ed. J. Lathrop 1861).
7
See, e.g., Toledo Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 F. 643 (N.D. Ohio
1913); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); H. HENN,
CoRPoRATIoNs 333 (1961).
8

See Burkin v. Katz, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956).
See Brevetti v. Tzougros, 42 Misc. 2d 171, 247 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
10 Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); cf. Been v.
Producers Ass'n, 352 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
"See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew%'s, Inc., 36 Del Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957);
Norman v. Roosevelt Democratic Club, 17 Misc. 2d 219, 184 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) (membership corporation).
12Petition of Korff, 198 App. Div. 553, 190 N.Y.S. 664 (1921); Eisenberg v.
Rodless Decorations, Inc., 106 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
0
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contractual rights which the executive may have against the corporation.13 As a practical matter, however, the phrase "at pleasure" may
overstate the ease with which a corporation may amputate an unwanted executive. As the dependent clause concerning contractual
rights suggests, the statement that a corporate officer holds office at the
pleasure of the board refers only to the agency relationship between
company and executive. 4 Like all agencies, it may be terminated at
will by either party.15 Many-perhaps most-executives have no
employment contracts with their companies and, hence, may be
cashiered without penalty. 6 But a substantial number of executives
do have such contracts;' 7 they hold office at the pleasure of the board,
but the board may find it expensive to indulge the pleasure of discharging them.
Because the prospect of a large damage judgment against the corporation can deter a board from discharging an unsatisfactory executive, the courts have been moved to impose certain limits on the
amount of liability to which a board may expose its corporation by
invalidating contracts that seem of inordinate length. 8 But it is not
every contract which extends beyond the term of the board which will
be held invalid. 9 There is a legitimate corporate interest in giving
executives some guarantee of tenure, and contracts for terms of five
years have been upheld by the courts. 20 In such instances discharging
an executive can still prove a costly business unless the corporation
can prove, if later challenged in an action for breach of contract, that
it was justified in dismissing the executive. That is, that it had "cause."
Most often justification is established by showing that the executive
was himself in breach of an express or implied condition of the employment contract. The most common express condition seems to be
one which the courts would imply in any event: an executive shall
discharge his obligations of due care and loyalty to the corporation. 2'
'13 See H. BALANTIE, CoRPORaTIons 436-37 (rev. ed. 1946).
'.41 G. HORNSTmw, CORPORATio LAW Aim PRAcTicE 220-21 (1959);

cf. In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
15 See W. SEAvrY, AGENcY 87 (1964); RtsTATrsNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118
(1959).
:161 G. WASHIGTON & V. RoTHscHID, CoziPENSATG THE CORPORATEs ExECUnvR
35, 36-37 n.5 (3d ed. 1962).
'7 Id. at 36-37.
Is See General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 57 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1932). See also
cases cited in 1 G. HoRsTrm, supra note 14, at 221 n.16.
9 Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930).
20
See United Producers & Consumers Coop. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1955). According to 1 G. WAsHIGToN & V. RomHscHmD, supra note 16, at 37-38,
five
year contracts are not uncommon.
21
A typical employment contract "almost always states that [the executive]
will perform 'faithfully and to the best of his ability!" 1 G. WASHINGTON & V.
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In addition to performing these fundamental duties, the employee
must also observe his proper place in the corporate hierarchy, obey
his superiors, and not struggle for power in a boorish or unseemly
manner. 22 As will be seen, the "cause" which affords the corporation
a defense to an executive's contract action seems to be essentially the
same as the "cause" which warrants removal of a director. It may be
asked then in what sense the director's position differs from the executive's.
First, it appears that the director's right to be discharged only for
cause results from his status, not from any contract. In the executive's
case it is up to him in the first instance to bargain for his own protection; otherwise, the courts will not protect him. But the director's
protection does not depend on this. The inference is that there is some
policy of corporation law which is being thus furthered. Second, the
executive is not entitled to hold his position. His remedy is money
damages; 23 only in the most extraordinary case will a court in effect
restore an executive to his position by specifically enforcing his contract. 4 By contrast the ousted director has an array of remedies which
will reinstate him. He may seek mandamus, 25 quo warranto, 26 or an
injunction against his replacement.2 7 Some states offer a statutory
action to try title,28 and in rare instances a court may step in before
the attempted removal and enjoin it, if the attempt is invalid on its
face. 25 Whatever the form or the label, the effect is the same. The
director retains his office.
Finally, the law insists upon an intra-corporate hearing. Several
ROTSCHILD, supra note 16, at 42. Compare that language with the contract terms
implied in such cases as Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); Fells
v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931); Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S2d 572
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
2
2See, e.g., McClayton v. W.B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1946);
Shafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 143 A. 613 (R.I. 1928); Freeman v. King Pontiac
Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960).
23 See Note, Removal Without Cause of Corporate Executives Under Agreement,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 224, 237-40 (1960), and cases therein discussed.
24 Id. at 240-42.
25
Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532 (1827); Detwiler v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dickinson, 131 Pa. 614, 18 A. 990 (1890).
20
State ex rel. Koski v. Kylmanen, 178 Minn. 164, 226 N.W. 401 (1929); Walker
v. Maas, 4 N.J. Misc. 230, 132 A. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1926); People ex rel. Manice v.
Powell,
201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911).
27
Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Been v. Producers
Ass'n, 352 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
2
sEssential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371,
159 A.2d 288 (Ch. 1960); In re Roosevelt Leather Hand Bag Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 735
(Sup.
Ct. 1947).
2
9E.g., Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957);
Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill.
App. 534 (1905).
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decisions have invalidated attempted removals solely because of the
failure to afford the director the procedural safeguards which are his
due. There is no similar requirement in the case of the executive.
Naturally, if the potential judgment against the corporation is substantial, a circumspect board will wish to make sure of its facts and of
the legal consequences of those facts before acting, but there is no requirement that this be done. The board may act as arbitrarily as it
wishes. Later a court will conduct a trial de novo, make its own
30
findings of fact, and apply the legal principles it deems appropriate.
If the facts establish that cause actually existed, no damages will be
awarded.31
Judging from the rules themselves, if taken at face value, and these
distinctions between the director's position and the executive's position,
the legal rules regarding the removal of corporate directors are intended to loosen the shareholders' control over the board which they
elect. This article will first attempt to discover what interest or interests are being furthered by insulating the board from the shareholders. It will then look more closely at some of the more salient
features of the law of removal in an effort to see how these features
are related to the apparent interests being furthered.

II. THEoRIcAL Jus=

CATioNs

A. The Evolution of the Present Rules
The present law governing the removal of corporate directors seems
3 2
to have had its genesis in cases involving municipal corporations.
Early writers on corporations did not distinguish between corporations
serving very different functions.3 3 After a rather perfunctory classifying of the various types of corporations in existence, their discussion
of legal principles and rules would proceed as if it were irrelevant
whether the corporation to which the law was to be applied were lay
or ecclesiastical, private or municipal, business or eleemosynary. 34
Precedents involving particular types of corporations were treated as
30

E.g., Templeman v. Grant, 75 Colo. 519, 227 P. 555 (1924); Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mlich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946).
31
See Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946);
Freeman v. King Pontiac Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960); cf. Stott v.
Stott Realty Co., 246 Mich. 267, 224 N.W. 623 (1929).
32
See, e.g., Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, 97 Eng. Rep. 426 (K.B. 1758); Lord
Bruce's Case, 2 Strange 819, 93 Eng. Rep. 870 (K.B. 1728).
33
Williston, The History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, in
3 SELECT ESSAYS 3N AiquLo-AmrsIcAN LEGAL HISTORY 195 (1909).
3

4 See J. A-GELL & S. A.ss, supra note 6, at 411-29.
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interchangeable with precedents concerning distinctly different types. 5

As a result, doctrines appropriate to a corporation performing one
function were transferred without analysis to other corporations with
wholly dissimilar functions.
More specifically, it could readily be concluded that the aldermen of
a municipality should be insulated from the electorate between elections. Since it was their job to regulate the behavior of that very
electorate, fulfilling that function would inevitably cause irritation
among the citizenry. Some degree of independence had to be afforded
them if their regulatory tasks were to be performed. It might be expected that the Crown would certainly take this view since it looked
upon municipal corporations, for all their "ancient liberties," as instruments of royal policy.3" If other forces operating on the aldermen
could be reduced or neutralized, the objectives of the Crown might
well play a larger role in shaping their decisions. Initially, the great
trading companies chartered by the Crown had a similar regulatory
function, as did the guilds. Whereas the municipalities regulated all
those within a given geographical area, the chartered corporations
controlled all those persons who plied a particular trade.3 7 Here too
there was reason to shield directors from the ire of those they regulated, and here too such shielding might well operate to make the
directors more responsive to Crown policy by diminishing a counterpressure.38 To be sure, both municipal aldermen and company directors would have to stand for re-election, but the time lag would give
the electorate a chance to cool down, a process often hastened when
the imagined ill-effects of some regulation failed to materialize or when
the board made another, more popular decision.
These functional similarities, however, do not explain why the rule
that the shareholders of a business corporation may not remove directors at will became embedded in American law. It would seem that
only the tendency of the writers to treat all corporations as essentially
subject to the same rules accounts for this. While the modern business
corporation resulted from a fusing of the chartered corporation with
the contractual financing device known as the joint stock company,3 9
3

GThis tendency has shown up in relatively recent decisions by sophisticated
courts. See In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931).
3
6See Chayes, The Moder Corporationand the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIEr 25, 33 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
37 Williston, supra note 33, at 198, 201.
3
8 See generally J. CLAPHAmr, A CONCISE EcoNonric HISTORY OF BRITAIN FROM THE
EARLIEST TZIES TO 1750, at 253-72 (1963).
so Chayes, supra note 36, at 33. See generally A. DuBois, TnE ENGLISH Busnmss
CoimPANY AFTER =H BUBBLE ACT, 1720-1800 (1938), for an historical account of
this development. An interesting student note has recently dusted off the joint
stock device and suggested it as a possible tool for solving some of the current
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American law has always tended to emphasize the entity, the corporation.40 During the early nineteenth century, when American law
was being molded, the natural law approach of legal thinkers 41 induced them to conceive of their task as elaborating the characteristics
of a metaphysical entity. By contrast, England, which tended to focus
on the contractual aspects of the corporation, has had a rather different
development.42 The idea that shareholders may not remove directors
43
at will seems strange to English observers.

Such considerations no longer justify making removal of corporate
directors difficult and complicated if easy removal would better serve
contemporary needs. If the director is to continue to occupy a unique
and enviable status so far as tenure is concerned, it should be because
modern conditions continue to warrant differing treatment for directors and executives.
B. The Conceptualistic Approach
The most common explanation of the difference between the rules
governing removal of a director and those governing the ouster of an
executive is that the latter is an agent, whereas the former is not.4 It
may be freely conceded that directors of a corporation are not the
agents of the shareholders since they are not subject to direct control
by the shareholders while in office.45 Even if the directors were removable at will and, thus, subject to somewhat greater shareholder
influence than exists under the present rules, the directors and not the
shareholders would still be the group which in the first instance made
problems of close corporations. See Note, The Joint Stock Company and the
Problems
of the Close Corporation,50 IowA L. Rnv. 118 (1964).
40
Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law,
69 HiARv. L. roy. 1369, 1376-77 passim, (1956).
41
See generally R. Poum, THE FomATn ERA OF AmmIcN LAW 3-30 (1938).
42
In Inderwick v. Snell, 2 MAc. & G. 216, 42 Eng. Rep. 83 (Ch.. 1850), the court
apparently laid down a rule which would permit shareholders to remove directors
at will. Later, in Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson, 23 Ch. D. 1 (1882),
the court refused to sanction an attempt by the shareholders to remove an unwanted director. Although there were certain differences in the provisions of
the articles of the two companies involved and both courts acted as if the issue
were largely one of construction, these differences do not completely explain
the results. The Hampson court did not refer to the Inderwick case. As noted in
note 4 supra, removal with or without cause is now expressly permitted by
statute in England.
43 Gower, supra note 40, at 1389.
44
See, e.g., People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911);
I. 45BALLATINE, CoaRoRATIoNs 434 (rev. ed. 1946).
See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLosE CoaORATioNs § 359 (1959), for a good statement of this
rule from the practical angle. The authorities cited in note 4 supra give the theoretical approach.
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the decisions regarding the corporate objectives and the means to be
employed in attaining them. For this reason, it would seem that removal at will is not inconsistent with non-agent status since direct, ongoing control over the agent by the principal is the distinctive feature
of the agency relationship. 4 Thus, simply saying that directors are
not agents does not advance the analysis very far. The director's
status as a non-agent does not depend upon the removal rules, and
more fundamentally, such a statement relates nothing positive about
the true status of a director. It leaves open, therefore, the possibility
that he could be placed in a different pigeonhole which also admitted
of removal at will.
Recognition of this fact has often induced courts or commentators
to go further and affix a label to the director: he is a "trustee"" or a
"political representative."4 While it is true that a trustee may be removed only for "cause,"' 9 the removal is done by an equity court. 50
On the other hand, a majority of the courts which have passed on the
point have held that an equity court has no inherent power to remove
a director, even for cause. 51 The most distinctive aspect of the law
regarding removal of the corporate director is the requirement of an
intra-corporate hearing. Courts have not required beneficiaries to
conduct similar hearings. Moreover, it is not the usual custom for
trustees to run for re-election.
This last objection to the label "trustee" can be avoided by using the
label "political representative." This also has the virtue of suggesting
the apparent origin of the removal rules, but as noted above, the
regulatory task of the political representative provides a reason for
complicating the procedures for his removal which does not apply to
the corporate director. Furthermore, several states and municipalities
permit the recall of political representatives before their terms expire,5" so the label itself is not an infallible guide to the appropriate
rule in governing removal. Regardless of which label is selected, the
basic difficulty remains: fumctionally and conceptually the director is
4

3RESTATmIENT

(SEcoND)

OF AGENCY § 14C (1959); W. SEAvEy

AGENCY

18-19

(1964).
47 People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); 29 ST.
JoHN's L. Rsv. 298 (1955).
48 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 313 (1955).
4 RESTATESMENT (SEcoxD) OF TRUSTS § 107, comments b & c (1959); 1 A. ScoTT,

TRusTs § 107 (1956). Compare Jones v. Stubbs, 136 Cal. App. 2d 490, 288 P.2d 939,
947 (1955), with Achenbach v. Baker, 151 Kan. 827, 101 P.2d 937, 944 (1940).
50 1 A. Scowr, supra note 49, at § 107.3.
51
See, e.g., Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945); Whyte v.
Faust, 281 Pa. 444, 127 A. 234 (1924). See generally Annot, 124 A.L.R. 364 (1940).
52 C. JOHNSON, H. CASTLEBERRY, T. S
LocAL GOvERNmmET

130 (4th ed. 1965).

svANSOx
& D.

OGDEN, AmaERIcAN STATE AND
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sui generis 3 despite his sharing certain attributes with agents, trustees,
and representatives. That being so, why choose one label over another?
Inevitably, this approach leads back to the starting point; the question
of justification remains unanswered.
C. An Interest Analysis
A more productive approach would seem to be to deternine exactly
what interests are in fact being furthered by making removal difficult.
Any shift from the conceptual level to the factual level requires some
attempt to put the matter in perspective. The most important single
fact is that attempts to remove directors during their terms are rare
occurrences which signal a deep factional cleavage within the corporation. 54 While this lack of attempts may result in part from the difficulty
of removal, it may be more significant that in the ordinary course
the shareholders will have an opportunity to vote on the director's
performance in less than a year. Only if the shareholders are
highly incensed will they be moved to immediate action. For this
to happen, the director's alleged blunder or dishonesty must be quite
egregious, and the chance of a repetition extremely high. This conclusion seems borne out by the experience of those states and municipalities which instituted the recall; fears that the device would lead to
political instability and government by demagogue as the passionate
masses toppled governments55 proved completely unfounded. 5 Shareholders seem to possess the same level of apathy.
Contrariwise, it would seem likely that if there is hostility between
the shareholders and the directors, it will become manifest long before
removal proceedings are commenced. Many, probably most, directors
would prefer to resign their positions if it appeared that a majority of
the shareholders wanted them out.5 7 Indeed, boards have been known
to remove them when the vote
to resign after an unsuccessful attempt
58
in favor of removal was substantial.
5

3Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors,19 B.U.L. Rsv. 12-16 (1939).
VOTING FOR DmECTORS 57 (1951). The tabulation of
mims, CumATI

54 C. W

the frequency with which certain issues were proposed by non-management
shareholders under the SEC's proxy rules contained in F. ExMEsoN & F. LATChAM,
SHAREHOLDER DmrOcaAcY 125-27 (1954), shows that removal proposals were quite
uncormon.
55 E.g., E. BACON & M. WymAI, DIECT ELECTioNS AND LAWIMANG By PoPPmu
VOTE 50-77 (1912).
56 See H. KAurarN, POLITICS Am POLIcIEs IN STATE AmD LOCAL GovERNmENTs 94-95
(1963); C. JOHNSON, H. CASTLEBERRY, T. SwANsONT & D. OGDENT, Awmx CA STATE AND
LOCAL Gov mImNT 130 (4th ed. 1965).
57

See What's New in CorporationLaws, 8 Bus. LAW., Jan. 1953, at 1, 31-32.
See E. ARANow & IL EnHoe, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE Co NRoL 69-70
(1957).
58
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Clearly, then, making removal at will possible is not enacting shareholder democracy. All it allows is the ouster of unwanted directors
in those rare cases in which the shareholders can be moved to action.
Any attempt to justify the present rules must take account of the relative infrequency of removal attempts and the high emotion which
ordinarily accompanies them.
1. Protecting the Minority Shareholder
It may be argued that the board must be independent in order to
protect minority shareholders. 59 To say that the director has certain
duties to the corporation is merely a shorthand way of saying that he
has duties to all shareholders as a group and not merely the faction
which put him in office.60 If removal at will were possible, the board
would become unduly responsive to the desires of the majority. The
first problem raised by such an argument is one of standing. If it is
the interest of the minority shareholder which is being protected, why
not require him to raise the point? In almost all instances, however,
the party lodging an objection to an attempted removal is the director
himself. The courts have ordinarily not objected to this. Indeed, in
the leading case of Campbell v. Loew's, Inc.,61 when a shareholder attempted to enjoin a proposed ouster, an issue was made of his standing. Objections of this kind are hardly conclusive, but they do suggest
that there is some problem in explaining the cases in terms of the
minority shareholder's interest, or any interest other than the director's.
More fundamentally, the argument speaks of "majority" and "minority" as if they were unchanging masses rather than shifting coalitions
of individual shareholders. 62 To the extent that each shareholder has
roughly the same opportunity to be a member of the "majority," it
cannot be said that permitting removal at will would lead to the
Go This may be seen most clearly in the case of a corporation in which cumulative voting is permitted. See, e.g., In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952); 22 U. CHL L. Rsv. 751 (1955). But even if a given
director cannot be identified as the representative of a minority, the threat of
removal may induce directors to favor the majority view. Cf. F. O'NEA & J.
DERWnv, ExPuLsoNr OR OPPRESSION

OF

BusiNEss AssocmiEs

§

3.05 (1961).

60 This was the theory of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v.
Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.). As noted in note 4 supra, Professor Gower
believes that doubt has been cast upon the continued vitality of Cuninghame by
the change in the English removal rules which now permit a majority of the
shareholders to remove a director without cause. Professor Gower apparently
sees the restrictions on removal as basically designed to protect the minority
shareholders.
61 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
2 Cf. R. DmmL, MODEM POLITICAL ANALYSIS 78-79 (1963).
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systematic disadvantaging of anyone, much less oppression.63 It is
true, of course, that shareholdings vary greatly in size and that the
larger blocs have a greater potentiality for influence as a result of
voting by share instead of by head. In any case, unless the voting
blocs are fixed, even the small shareholder may hold important votes.
If the blocs are rigidly formed into majority and minority, as where
one shareholder holds sixty percent of the shares and the other, forty
percent, the argument has somewhat more force, but is still not compelling. With the majority thus fixed, there is a great likelihood that
its views will be known. Indeed, it is possible for the majority to
convene a shareholders' meeting simply to put its views on record. 4
In the nature of things it is going to exert more influence over the
board than the minority. The question is whether making removal
more difficult has much value in keeping majority influence within
proper bounds. Allowing removal without cause is a long way from
permitting the majority to intervene directly to overrule a board
decision. Apart from simple shareholder inertia, there are other
reasons why a majority which would be willing to overrule a board
would not wish to remove it.6 The majority might feel that the board
was in general doing a satisfactory job, or it might not have any replacements who could do better. Given the infrequency with which
removals are attempted, it is doubtful that facilitating removal by
majority vote would add greatly to the majority's power to oppress.
Any such increase in power must be balanced against any benefits
which would accrue from making removal easier. The rationale of
protecting minority rights does not discriminate between large and
small minorities; apparently any shareholder vote short of unanimity
would still leave a minority to be oppressed. Under such circumstances one recalcitrant shareholder could saddle an overwhelming
majority with a totally unsatisfactory board. At this point one wonders just who is being oppressed.
Suppose, however, that the shareholders vote unanimously to oust a
director. 66 If the sole purpose of the rules is to protect the minority
shareholders, it would seem that there would be no restrictions on
63 Cf. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255 (1929) (majority
may amend charter to eliminate cumulative voting since this right inheres in each
share and not in a minority).
64
Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); See 40 CoRNii L.Q. 370
(1955).
65 66 H~Av. L. REv. 531 (1953). Professor Lattin seems to take a contrary view,
arguing that allowing removal at wil would convert the directors into "mere
puppets of the shareholders." N. LATn, COmOR TIONS 213 (1959).
66
One leading commentator believes that the shareholders should be able to
make corporate decisions directly if they are unanimous. 1 G. HoRNsTIn=, CoRPoRATIOx LAw AwD PRACTicE § 178 (1959).
A fortiori, they should be able to
cashier an unwanted director. But see LATTmn, supra note 65, at 213.
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what the shareholders might do unanimously. Three cases have been
found in which the directors were removed by unanimous vote, but
they are complicated by other issues. In one case, 6 what appears to
have been the only two shareholders of a corporation met informally
in a hospital waiting room and held a discussion. It was alleged that
this was an official shareholders' meeting and that the directors were
validly removed. The court apparently took the view that the meeting
was not called for the purpose of removal, that it just happened, and
that it could not be deemed a shareholders' meeting. Furthermore, the
subsequent conduct of the shareholders was inconsistent with their
contention that this was a valid shareholders' meeting. All in all, the
case is hardly strong support for the idea that directors may not be
removed at will if all of the shareholders concur.
In Frank v. Anthony, 3 the plaintiff was the sole shareholder of the
corporation as well as a director and the president. Shortly after the
formation of the corporation, which had occurred recently, two of the
original directors resigned and plaintiff filled the vacancies. Thereafter, his appointees asked him to resign as president and, upon his
refusal, they discharged him. The plaintiff immediately convened himself as a shareholders' meeting and voted to remove his two appointees.
In an action for declaratory judgment, the court held the plaintiff's
ouster as president valid and the removal of the directors invalid.
Taking the case at face value, it would seem to indicate that other
interests are being protected by the law governing removal besides
that of the minority, for here there was no minority to protect. It is
true that the opinion recites additional facts which suggest that the
court may not have treated the case as one involving unanimous shareholder action. Plaintiff and defendants had been interested in an
existing partnership, and the corporation had been formed to acquire
valuable real estate from the partnership. Their arrangement anticipated that the defendants would soon become substantial shareholders
in the corporation; plaintiffs position as sole shareholder was a
temporary expedient. In a sense the plaintiff attempted to squeeze
6 9
This
the defendants out, and they retaliated by squeezing him out.
analysis certainly explains a result which would otherwise seem inexplicable if only the interest of the minority were involved. However,
it raises the question why the court remarked:
As to whether or not appellant was the sole stockholder of the corporanot necessary to the
tion, the trial court made no finding and such was
determination of the issues decided by the court.70
7nh re Louisiana Inv. & Loan

F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1965).

Corp., 224 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 342

a8 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
00 F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, supra note 59, at § 5.11; 12 U. FLA. L. R v. 232 (1959).

70 107 So. 2d at 138.
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This seems to suggest that the absence of a minority was irrelevant.
In the case of Textite, Inc. v. Wineburgh,71 a Texas court took a
different tack. Plaintiff and his family sold their holdings, amounting
to practically all the stock in Texlite, but plaintiff remained as a
director and was appointed executive vice-president. Two months
later, at a special shareholders' meeting, the buyers unanimously voted
to remove the plaintiff as director and to direct the board to abolish
the office of executive vice-president, which the board promptly did.
Plaintiff who had no notice of either the shareholders' or the directors'
meeting, contested the validity of the shareholders' acts.
The court first dismissed the procedural objections to the shareholders' meeting, holding these to be for the benefit of the shareholders; the plaintiff, a non-shareholder, had no standing to raise them.
Moving to the issue of the shareholders' power to remove a director,
the court first agreed that at common law a majority of the shareholders could not oust a director without cause. Then it said:
But this is not to say that all of the stockholders, acting in unison, cannot
lawfully remove a director, who is not a shareholder,at any time with or
without cause. We do not mean to announce one rule applicable to a
majority of shareholders and another rule applicable where the decision
is unanimous; it is simply a matter of determining who has the right to
complain of such action. If a director be removed by a majority of the
shareholders without cause, those of the minority have a right to object
on the ground that the action breaches the understanding among shareholders implicit in the organization of the corporation under the statute,
that the directors elected shall remain in office for the term . . . [for
which elected unless removed in accordance with the bylaws],72 to represent all the shareholders in managing the affairs of the company. But
can the removed director be heard to complain, when it appears he is
neither shareholder in nor creditor of the corporation? We think not, and
hold that under the facts of this case appellee had no right to complain of
his removal as a director and that such removal was therefore effective.78

Regardless of how the Texlite opinion is interpreted, it seems to be
denying any personal right of the director to his position. As previously noted, this seems contrary to the bulk of the decisions, which
simply assume that the director has standing to complain. 4 It runs
counter also to language appearing in some opinions that the director
has a vested right to his position. 7- Yet, the court in Texiite seemed
71373 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).

72 This insert is from TmX. Bus. CoRp. AcT art. 2.32 (Vernon 1956). The court
used the word "etc.," but it appears from the context that this is the language to
which "etc." referred.
73 373 S.W.2d at 328-29.
74
See, e.g., Petition of KorfF, 198 App. Div. 553, 190 N.Y.S. 664 (1921); Petition
of Holzer, 209 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Teperman v. Atcos Baths, Inc., 4
Misc. 2d 738, 158 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1956); In re Schwartz, 119 Visc. 387, 196
N.Y.S. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Jacobson v. Backman, 16 Utah 2d 356, 401 P.2d 181
(1965).
7
5 In re Automotive Mfrs. Ass'n, 120 Misc. 405, 199 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
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unwilling to actually tie the law of removal entirely to the interest of
the minority shareholders. The court's insistence that it was not laying down a separate rule for unanimous action, that it was treating the
issue solely as one of standing, and its suggestion that a creditor might
be able to object, raise the possibility that the removal rules may be
designed, at least in part, to protect the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies of the directors, such as creditors, employees, customers,
and suppliers.
It goes without saying that the result in Frankis also consistent with
the hypothesis that the interests of such constituencies are being
furthered by the rules making removal difficult. Frank,however, may
also be explained on the ground that the court was protecting the interest of the director in holding his office.
2. Balancing the Interests of Corporate Constituencies
The idea that the directors and executives of a corporation should
manage the enterprise solely in the interests of the shareholders is
now widely considered an antiquarian notion by both managers and
scholars.7 6 According to spokesmen for this view, managers have
responsibilities toward all groups having a significant interest in the
77
earnings of the enterprise and in an equitable distribution thereof.
The essence of managerial statesmanship is seen as the striking of an
appropriate balance among the interests asserted by these groups. Of
the interests involved only that of the shareholders may be asserted
through the franchise, with the other groups being left to press their
cases through other means. Fortunately, the oft-noticed "separation
of ownership and control"7 8 and the attendant apathy among shareholders in corporate giants largely neutralizes the advantage afforded
by the franchise. It may be argued that making it easier for shareholders to remove directors would disturb the balance of forces
operating upon the directors and make them unduly responsive to the
shareholders, thus diminishing the influence of the other interest
groups. In a sense this modern reason for insulating the board from
the shareholders parallels the original reason. It allows for the
operation of desirable counter-pressures.

76See, e.g., R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES ON CouponATIoNs 166-67 (3d ed. 1958)
(quoting from Peter Drucker, Owen D. Young, then President of General
Electric, and Continental Can Co.'s 1948 Annual Report).
77The classic statement on this is Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156-61 (1932). This led to the famous BerleDodd debate. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HAnV. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the FiduciaryDuties
of Corporate Managers Practicable?,2 U. CnL L. REV. 194 (1934). '
78 The classic exposition on this point, which remains the best today, is A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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This theory would account for the result in Frank as well as the
suggestion in Texlite that a creditor would have standing to complain
about the removal of a director without cause by a unanimous shareholder vote. But this theory raises problems too. In the first place
it is only theory. Apart from the Frank and Texlite cases-and both
may be explained on other bases 7 9-there is little in the removal cases
to suggest that this is what the courts are doing. To the contrary, the
fact that the directors are usually the complaining parties raises the
same questions of standing which were noted above in connection with
the discussion of the minority shareholder.8 0 As a general matter
there is little support in corporation precedents of any type for the
suggestion that the courts have discarded the traditional idea that the
job of the corporation's managers is to maximize profits for the shareholders."'
Moreover, the theoretical case for broadening the concept of the
corporate constituency remains unproven. Experiments in other
countries with representatives of labor,8 2 or the public, 8 3 have not
produced the salutary results anticipated.8 4 Furthermore, it may be
doubted whether this theory provides any guidelines for the director.
Whatever the defects of the profit-maximization standard, it at least
indicated in a general way what policies the board should adopt.85
But a standard which tells the director to work out an equitable adjustment of various interests, some of which are in direct conflict,
essentially leaves him on his own. It is far too vague to be a judicially
enforceable standard of conduct.86 This may explain why the courts
have given no indication that the law governing removal is even remotely tied to a policy of implementing this theory.
Even if the courts were to adopt this broader conception of the
director's responsibilities, it is by no means clear that facilitating re79 Frank may be viewed as not involving unanimous shareholder action; the
remark
in Texlite may be dismissed as ill-considered dictum.
80
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
81 An exception might be the more liberal attitude toward charitable contributions by corporations although these are sometimes explained as good public
relations and hence profitable in the long run. See R.BAKME & W. CARY, supra.
note 76, at 366-67.
82See Vagts, Reforming the "Moderm" Corporation: Perspectives From the.
German, 80 HAlv. L. Rsv. 23, 64-78 (1966).
8
3See E. NOLTE, THRESE FAcEs OF FAscism 261 (1966) (discussion of the "syndicalism" of the Italian fascists). It is revealing that Nazi Germany rejected the
Italian solution in favor of more indirect state controls. See Vagts, supra note 82,
at 84.
84 Id.at 76-78, 85-87.
85 See Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible,
in THE CORPORATOnN IN MODERN Soc=mr 46 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
86
See R. EzLms, THE GovERsNsr OF CoaRonRAioNs 207-10 (1962).
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moval would be inconsistent with it. Again, it is important not to
magnify the likelihood that the removal device would be used. As a
practical matter, it is unlikely to increase significantly the number of
removal attempts. It is true that the additional control given the
shareholders may well influence the board in the case of a conflict
among interest groups, but the strength of this influence in any given
case is almost entirely a matter of speculation. So much turns on the
psychological makeup of individual directors and the power position
of the group opposed to the shareholders 7 that generalization seemg
futile. There seems to be no single delicate equilibrium which would
be inevitably destroyed.
In sum, it is doubtful if the courts have been protecting such a
balance; it is questionable whether they can or should protect it, if it
exists; and it is problematical whether it does exist. The interest
protected by complicating removal, however, is something else.
3. The Corporate Interest
In a sense, the corporate interest is a variant of the preceding theory,
but it breaks away from the interest or interests of any distinct group.
It asserts that there is a separate corporate interest to be furthered by
preventing the shareholders from removing directors at will. This
theory eliminates any standing problem because there is no other
group to whom the job of asserting the corporate interest can be
8
Conassigned. In reality this argument is a form of elitist theory.
ceiving of the business enterprise as an organic whole, it states that the
managers know best how to keep the organism healthy and growing.
Allowing for even a bit more shareholder intervention will result in a
lowering of the quality of the corporate decisions because it tampers
with the elite's autonomy. Only if the elite is left free in its discretion
can it function with maximum effectiveness. 89 Poorer decisions leave
all groups interested in the enterprise, including the shareholders,
worse off. As members of this elite the directors have an unusually
keen appreciation of exactly what the corporate interest is.
To the extent that this argument reflects nothing more than a fear
.of sharp reversals in corporate policy as the shareholders unseat
boards with the same gleeful abandon with which the parliament of
the Fourth Republic unseated governments, one may once again
summon the answer that experience shows it does not happen. How,ever, the theory stands for something more. Even if the removal power
generally R. GoRso , BusmEss LEADERSHP 3N =E LARGE CoRpoRATioN
189-221, 253-58 (1961).
88 See generally P. BAcHRACa, THE THEORY OF Ds ocRATic ELrnisi (1967).
89 Cf. J. SCHUIpTER, CAPiTsLM, SoCLISm AND DERiocRAcY 295 (3d ed. 1950).
87 See
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is rarely used, the board may be cowed by the threat of it and refrain
from taking some vital but unpopular step. The fear of this sort of
subtle psychological pressure is largely speculation and, it would seem,
poor speculation. It assumes that, owing to the maladroitness of the
board or the impenetrable stupidity of the shareholders, the board
simply will not be able to explain why it took the steps it did and why
those steps are best for the corporation. Further, it assumes that
directors are so pusillanimous as to be constantly haunted by the possibility of being removed. There is no evidence that either assumption
is correct, and in the absence of such evidence it might better be
assumed that the directors have enough courage to do what they think
best and enough talent to explain themselves, and that the shareholders have enough good sense to understand the explanation.
Moreover, if the elitist hypothesis were really behind the rules regarding removal, it would apply only to removal by the shareholders.
On the other hand, if the removal were by the board itself, the logical
thing for a court to do would be withdraw, leaving the majority of the
elite to discern the elusive corporate interest. In fact, the courts have
been even tougher on attempts by boards to remove one of their
members. 90 Not only do the courts deny any inherent power in the
board to remove its own members, even for cause, 9 but the delegation of power from the shareholders must be explicit. 2 A general
delegation of the power to make bylaws will not authorize the board to
pass a bylaw giving itself the power to remove its own members9
Even an explicit bylaw will not transfer the whole of the removal
power; the shareholders still retain their "inherent" power to remove
directors.9 4 These restrictions suggest that the courts are not really
protecting some form of elitist structure.
4. The Director's Personal Interest
All that remains, then, is the director's personal interest in remaining in office. This theory accounts for the language in the cases about
vested rights, for the almost complete failure to question the director's
standing to object to his own removal, and for such rules as the pro90

See Annot., 63 A.L.R. 776 (1929), and cases cited.
91 Bruch v. National Guar. Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 A. 738 (Ch. 1922);
Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 246 Vich. 267, 224 N.W. 623 (1929); People ex rel. Manice
v. 92
Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911).
Explicit delegations have been upheld. See Petition of Singer, 189 Misc. 150,
70 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), ajFd, 75 N.Y.S.2d 514 (App. Div. 1947).
93
See, e.g., Laughlin v. Geer, 121 M. App. 534 (1905); Raub v. Gerken, 127 App.
Div. 42, 111 N.Y.S. 319 (1908).
94
Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); cf. Campbell v. Loew's,
Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957).
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hibition against retroactive application of any charter or bylaw amendment which broadens the removal power.95 It may be asked why it
took all this time to reach a conclusion which was pretty obvious from
the beginning. The answer, it seems, is that while it was obvious that
the courts were protecting the director, it was not clear whether they
were doing this as an end in itself or as a means of protecting some
other interest. The preceding analysis suggests that there is no other
interest; hence, the emphasis is on "personal."
It was noted earlier that the executive's remedy, presuming he had
a contract, was an action for damages for breach of contract;98 his
contract would not be specifically enforced. This refusal to award
specific relief to the executive persists despite the fact that the conventional reasons for not enforcing personal service contracts are often
inapplicable to a corporate executive. There would be little difficulty
9
in ascertaining whether the corporation was fulfilling its promises; 7
there is no "involuntary servitude" on the part of the corporation;98
and it may well misdescribe the circumstances to speak of an intimate
personal relationship which it would be onerous to enforce 9 In
essence, what the courts are doing is limiting judicial protection to
the pecuniary rewards of the position. Any other rewards which
might accrue to the executive go unprotected.
The remedies available to the director, however, put him back in
office, or keep him there if the removal has not yet been consummated.
In effect, the director's interest in the psychological pleasure of his
title or the political pleasure of being a high-level decision-maker is
what is being protected by such remedies. This latter pleasure, however, can be given only limited protection. Although the courts can
protect his spot on the board, they cannot shield him from being systematically outvoted by the other board members or from being completely sterilized by the shareholders, who may "pack" the board of
directors at the annual meeting'0 0 or a special meeting' 0' and convert
Or E.g., H. HENN, CoRPoRATIoNs 304 (1951); cases cited note 110 infra.
06 See text accompanying notes 13-24 supra.
07 See 5A A. Coum, CONmIACTS § 1204 (1964), for a list of the various rationales.
I' There would, of course, be such a problem if the defendant were the employee,
and this may be thought to raise problems of '"mutuality."
0
9In the case of the closely held corporation, however, specific enforcement
would compel such a personal relationship. See Chayes, Madame Wagner and
the Close Corporation,73 Hnv. L. REv. 1532 (1960). The courts have not indicated that they would relax the rules on specific enforcement for larger
companies.
100 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (Ch.
1933).
101 Gold Bluff Mining & Lumber Corp. v. Whitlock, 75 Conn. 669, 55 A. 175
(1903); In re A.A. Griffing Iron Co., 63 N.J.L. 168, 41 A. 931 (1898); Republic
Corp. v. Carter, 22 App. Div. 2d 29, 253 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1964).
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an erstwhile majority into a minority. What remains to the members
of the old majority is the opportunity, however small, to persuade
some of the new members to come over to its side.
By treating these interests as worthy of judicial protection, the
courts are recognizing claims which seem to have been rejected in the
case of executives and have been explicitly rejected in the case of
labor union officials.30 2 It may be argued that-the director should be
given distinct treatment because the typical director has no contract
with his company and, despite the urgings of some noted commentators, 0 3 paid outside directors are not prevalent. 0 4 Customarily the
director qua director is a non-participant in the company's deferred
compensation plans and entitled to no salary apart from a nomimal fee
for each meeting. 0 5 Since the position carries no economic rewards,
the psychological and political rewards are the director's only incentives. 0 6 Granting that this argument has force, it would not seem
a complete answer. It assumes that making removal at will possible
would substantially dry up the supply of directors. This assumption
appears doubtful since directors are probably little concerned with
tenure as such when they come on a board. To the extent that the
board is an inside board, the members will be receiving the tangible
rewards accruing from their positions as executives. If some difficulty
in recruiting outside directors should be experienced, it may easily be
remedied by private adjustments, such as paying the director a salary.
Solutions of this nature would seem more satisfactory than according
the director a different legal status from that given executives.
5. Summary
The legal rules making removal of corporate directors difficult seem
designed to further a somewhat limited interest of the director in the
non-financial rewards of being a director. Others are entitled to protection of their financial rewards only. It does not appear that the
director is accorded this treatment as a means to achieving some other
end, such as preventing oppression of minority shareholders or preserving a balance of interests among various corporate constituencies.
Furthermore, it does not appear necessary to do so in order to insure
a supply of future directors, even outside directors.
' 0 2 Talton v. Behncke, 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952).

"The only loss he [the

president] has suffered is his pleasure and satisfaction in being president of the
union,--a
privilege not of legal character." Id. at 474.
03
See W. DOuGLAs, Dn mOcAcY AND FNANCE 52-53 (J. Allen ed. 1940).
104 1 G. WASHINGTON & H. ROTHSCmIn, COmPENSATING THE CORPOATE EXECUTIVE

261 (3d ed. 1962).

105 Id. at 266-67.
106

See R. GORDON, supra note 87, at 305-12.
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SOME ASPECTS Or THE LAW nT OPERATION

A. What Is Legally Sufficient Cause?
The requirement that there be sufficient cause for the removal of a
director continues to be a significant factor. Despite the fact that a
growing number of states have passed legislation permitting the shareholders to remove directors with or without cause,10 7 a majority of the
corporation statutes remain silent, 08 thus presumably giving the common-law rules full room to operate. A well-drafted provision in the
articles or bylaws may authorize removal at will in these latter
states, 10 but such a provision may not be effective in all cases. If it
first appears in an amendment, the provision ordinarily may not be
used against incumbent directors.1 10 Also it may be deemed to conflict
with some other norm embodied in the statute, articles, or bylaws. In
such cases, the courts quite often resolve the conflict by invalidating
that portion of the article or bylaw which purports to dispense with
the requirement of cause.1 ' Finally, notwithstanding the article or
bylaw, shareholders in a closely held corporation may agree to retain
themselves as directors. Where such agreements exist, the courts will
likewise be called upon to strike a balance between the bylaw authorizing removal without cause and the evident intention of the parties
to the agreement. Again, permitting removal only for cause is the
usual solution."' Despite the importance of the issue, sophisticated practitioners" 3
and legal scholars 1 4 alike have suggested that it is not possible to give
See Ary. STAT. ANN. § 64-304 (Supp. 1966); CoLo. R.v. STAT. § 31-5-5 (1963);
STAT. ANN. § 301.29
(1945); Miss. Cons AiNN. § 5309-75 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2039 (Supp.
1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27(f) (Supp. 1955); N.D. CENT. COD § 10-19-40 (Supp.
1965); OHIO REV. COD A.=. § 1701.58 (Page 1964); OimnA. STAT. AnN. tit. 18, § 1.39
(Supp. 1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.193 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-405
(Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE AN. § 12-18.7 (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE ANX. § 16-10-37
(Supp. 1965); VA. CODE Am. § 13.1-42 (Supp. 1966).
108 See ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CORP. AcT Am. § 36A, f 2.03.
109 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LW § 706 (b) (Supp. 1966).
110 Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); In re Automotive Mfrs. Ass'n, 120 Misc. 405, 199 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1923); In re Schwartz,
119 Misc. 387, 196 N.Y.S. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
Ill Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371,
159 A.2d 288 (1960); In -re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
'2-Lubliner v. Sylu Knitting Mills, Inc., 213 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re Roosevelt Leather Hand
Bag Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
"'3 See What's New in CorporationLaws, 8 Bus. Lzw., Jan. 1953, at 1, 28.
114 Note, 27 U. C. L. REv. 92, 94 (1958).
107

MiAss. GEsT LAws Ax, . ch. 156B, § 51 (Supp. 1966); Mnm.
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a meaningful, comprehensive definition. Other writers seem to accept
this view since they confine their remarks on "cause" to cataloging,
with greater or less completeness, instances in which a court has
passed on the sufficiency of a particular ground for dismissal." 5 Such
catalogs may readily be compiled. Cause for removal exists where the
director is guilty of "misconduct,"116 or has misapplied corporate
funds, 1 1 7 or has attempted to divert corporate business to another
enterprise in which he has an interest,1 8 or has acted beyond his
authority as an officer,:" 9 or has engaged in a planned scheme of
harassment.12 0 Contrariwise, cause does not exist simply because the
director has been indiscreet,' 2' or verbally abusive to other directors;

22

or has failed to attend meetings,' 2' or to carry out an assign-

ment given him by the board;124 or has been uncooperative; or has
attempted to gain control of the corporation 2 5 The trouble with such
catalogs is that they are at once too abstract and not abstract enough.
They are too abstract in that they summarize in a word or phrase a
total fact situation, and these summaries fail to indicate what turns
abuse into harassment. They are not abstract enough in that they are
unrelated to any principle which would enable a lawyer to predict the
result of a case which does not fit any existing precedent.
Given the scarcity of precedents, this cataloging may be the wisest
course. Nevertheless, there is possibly some value in suggesting a few
tentative generalizations. A good starting point would seem to be
the few generalizations essayed by the courts. 26 These have differed
somewhat in phraseology, but the fundamental ideas seem virtually
5
11
See 2 W.

FLMTcmR, CycLoPEDiA oF TH LAW OF PRIVAE CoRPoRATioNs § 356
(rev. 1954).
116 Fox v. Cody, 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y.S. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
"11Cf.Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc. v. Chandler, 183 Cal. App. 2d 823, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 216 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Hinldey v. Sagemiller, 191 Wis. 512, 210 N.W. 839
(1926).
l: 8 McClayton v. W.B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1946); Fells v. Katz,
256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931).
219 Roberts v. J.A. Masquere Co., 158 La. 642, 104 So. 484 (1925); People v. Lyon,
119 App. Div. 361, 104 N.Y.S. 319, aff'd per curiam,189 N.Y. 544, 82 N.E. 1130 (1907).
120 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957); Markovitz
v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939).
'21 Cf. Pierce v. Grand Army of the Republic, 224 Minn. 248, 28 N.W.2d 637
(1947).
122 Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532 (1827).
123A1liance Co-op. Ins. Co. v. Gasche, 93 Kan. 147, 142 P. 882 (1914); Halpin v.
Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N.Y.S. 412 (1897).
124 Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532 (1827).
125 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957).
126 See, e.g., Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931); People ex rel.
Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc.
210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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the same as those set forth by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Richardson,1 27
one of the fountainhead municipal corporation cases:
There are three sorts of offences for which an officer or corporator may
be discharged.
1st. Such as have no immediate relation to his office; but are in themselves of so infamous a nature, as to render the offender unfit to execute
any public franchise.
2d. Such as are only against his oath, and the duty of his office as a
corporator; and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to his
franchise or office.
3d. The third sort of offence for which an officer or corporator may be
the
displaced, is of a mixed nature; as being an offence not only against
28
duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common law.
Offenses of the first sort should be established by a jury verdict in a
formal legal proceeding,'1 29 but offenses of the other types might be
tried by the corporation itself. 130 After any of these offenses had been
established by the appropriate tribunal, removal would be proper.
There is no dearth of cases deciding what duties a director owes his
corporation, but these almost always involve a lawsuit by the corporation, or a shareholder suing in its behalf, against the director for
damages for injuries sustained by the corporation as a result of the
director's violation of his duty. Lord Mansfield's formulation suggests
that those cases, and the standards evolved in them, might be used to
determine when cause for removal exists. Thus, the first hypothesis
is that cause for removal exists whenever the director's actions would
subject him to liability for damages in a suit brought by the corporation. 131 Not only would this make available a large number of precedents elaborating the duty of care or the duty of loyalty as guides to
determining if cause exists, but this hypothesis is also doctrinally
appealing. It seems anomalous that a director's conduct would justify
a damage judgment against him but not warrant his being removed
from office. Moreover, if the cause requirement is designed to protect the director's interests by limiting removal to flagrant cases, such
a definition would be roughly tailored to that objective.
But transferring the doctrine from one context to another is tricky
business and should be done with an awareness of the limitations of
the method. In this particular instance, there are several pitfalls to
be avoided. In the first place, suits to surcharge the directors do not
occur until after there has been an actual injury to the corporation.
1271 Burr. 517, 97 Eng. Rep. 426 (1758).

Id. at 538, 97 Eng. Rep. at 438.
This seems akin to the modem power of a board to declare a director's
position vacant under certain circumstances, such as a conviction of a crime. IL
Hnm , CoRporATiONS 336 (1961).
130 1 Burr. at 539, 97 Eng. Rep. at 438-39.
131 See generally Dyson, The Director'sLiability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341
aOamoNs 432-553 (3d ed. 1958).
(1965); R. BAimR & W. CARY, CASES ON CoP
128

129
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Since it would be unreasonable to compel the shareholders to wait
until a director's antics harmed the corporation, most removal cases
will call upon the courts to judge the conduct of the director in the
abstract, without benefit of actual harm. But certain acts, or more
properly omissions, of the directors may not appear as violations of
any duty if no harm has resulted. For example, several cases have
held that the failure of a director to attend any board meetings at all
is not sufficient cause to remove him. 132 On the other hand, courts

have surcharged directors when their failure to attend a reasonable
number of board meetings has caused harm to the corporation. 133
Similarly, in Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School'

34

the refusal of a

director to attend meetings of the building committee, to which he had
been appointed by the board, was held insufficient grounds for removal. Surely he would have been liable if harm had resulted from
his petulant refusal. Although some tangible injury would be required
if it is sought to surcharge the director, the absence of such an injury
should not be an obstacle to removing a director for cause. Thus, in
the absenteeism cases, the failure of the director's inattendance to
cause injury to the corporation would be irrelevant in determining
whether cause for removal existed. If the cases rested on the absence
of harm, they would seem wrongly decided. To the extent that the
courts have heretofore made the presence of harm a determinative
factor in deciding whether the director has violated a duty to his corporation, the surcharge cases adhere to a more restrictive standard
than would be appropriate in a removal case.
This means that the courts must push beyond the standards of the
surcharge cases, and this, in turn, raises another problem. Courts may
tend to rely too heavily on the concepts of duty of care and duty of

loyalty and push a case into one of these molds when it really does not
fit there. It would seem that there already exist a number of cases
which arguably involve no breach of duty to the corporation. 35 For
example, in Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 the accused directors sought to

enjoin forthcoming removal proceedings on the ground, among others,
that the charges set out in the president's letter were inadequate as a
matter of law. Summarizing the letter, the court said:
132 Alliance Co-op. Ins. Co. v. Gasche, 93 Kan. 147, 142 P. 882 (1914); Halpin v.
Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N.Y.S. 412 (1897).
133 See Dyson, supra note 131, at 363 n.93 and authorities cited therein.
1346 Conn. 532 (1827).
135 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 At2d 852 (Ch. 1957); Smock v.
Buchanan & Smock Lumber Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 308, 125 A. 115 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924);
People v. Lyon, 119 App. Div. 361, 104 N.Y.S. 319, affd per curiam, 189 N.Y. 544,
82 N.E. 1130 (1907); Schafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 143 A. 613 (RI. 1928); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939).
13636 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957).
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First of all, it charges that the two directors (Tonilinson and Meyer)
failed to cooperate with Vogel [the president] in his announced program
for rebuilding the company; that their purpose has been to put themselves in control; that they made baseless accusations against him and
other management personnel and attempted to divert him from his normal
duties as president by bombarding him with correspondence containing
unfounded charges and other similar acts; that they moved into the company's building, accompanied by lawyers and accountants, and inmediately proceeded upon a planned scheme of harassment. They called for
many records, some going back twenty years, and were rude to the personnel. Tomlinson sent daily letters to the directors making serious
137
charges directly and by means of innuendos and misinterpretations.

The court held that the desire of the director to seize control of the
corporation was perfectly legitimate in itself, and hence neither it nor
refusal to cooperate with Vogel constituted cause for removal. But
conducting a planned scheme of harassment was another matter:
Certainly a director may examine books, ask questions, etc., in the discharge of his duty, but a point can be reached when his actions exceed the
call of duty and become deliberately obstructive. In such a situation, if his
actions constitute a real burden on the corporation then the stockholders
are entitled to relief. The charges in this area ... are legally sufficient
to justify the stockholders in voting to remove such directors.... 138

One way of looking at the case is to view it as involving a breach
of the duty of loyalty. Although it is perfectly proper for a director
to try to advance his own interests by grappling for control of the corporation, this is because he sincerely identifies the best interests of
the corporation with his coming to power. But it may happen that
the director's desire to control will get the better of him. While few
persons would deliberately destroy an enterprise in order to preside
over the rubble, the director may take steps which he knows will
cause the company some injury or, probably more likely, stop considering the company's interest altogether. This could easily be deemed disloyalty, a placing of the director's personal welfare ahead of the

company's.
By the same token, the case may be viewed as a violation of the
director's duty of care. Under this theory the director's will to power
so warps his judgment that he no longer can discern where the best
interests of the company lie. He still believes he is advancing the interests of the company, but his judgment is almost completely faulty. 13 9
He takes positions and performs acts which a reasonable, objective
observer would avoid.
137 Id.

at 576, 134 A.2d at 860.

138 Id. at 576-77, 134 A.2d at 860-61.
0

13 For example, the counsel for Vogel in the bitter fight over Loew's has described in detail some of the tactics employed by his opponents. In one letter
Tomlinson questioned the wisdom of a particular move from a tax standpoint.
Whatever other objections might have been made, it seems clear that it was poor
judgment for a director to go on record in a way which might ultimately be used
against the corporation by the tax authorities.

449-51 (1961).

See L. NizEa, My Li=E N CouRT
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However, there is yet another element in the case. Suppose a reasonable man could have decided that Vogel's rebuilding program was
0
the sheerest folly, that it was likely to cost the corporation dearly."1
Suppose further that this reasonable man could also conclude that
Vogel's presidency represented, in effect, the continuation in power
of a discredited faction of the corporation. 141 Could it not be argued
that under such circumstances he would have a duty to the corporation to seek power, to refuse to cooperate with Vogel, and even to
harass Vogel? In any case, could it be said that the director was being
disloyal or negligent if he turned obstructionist?
The director's position in the case hypothesized requires the court
to make an assessment of the probable impact of a projected program.
Courts are notoriously reluctant to make legal rights and obligations
turn on an evaluation of the wisdom of management policy. The socalled "business judgment" rule which protects directors charged with
negligence 1 42 seems largely an acknowledgement by the courts that only
in extreme cases are they qualified to judge policy. One alternative
to doing this is to enforce rigidly the hierarchy set up by the statute,
the corporate papers, the board, or custom. Corporate officials are
expected to respect their places in that hierarchy, to obey their superiors, to decline to arrogate power to themselves, and to employ the
accepted channels in presenting their views. Once decisions have
been made in the appropriate manner, officials should accept them or
seek to get them reversed by going through the same channels; they
should not subvert the hierarchy by obstructing decisions. One way
of enforcing the structure is to approve the ouster of any director who
seeks to subvert it, regardless of the merits of the policy dispute.
In other words, cause for removal exists if the director is not being a
good organization man, regardless of whether his conduct constitutes
a breach of duty.
The Campbell case may be looked upon as an example of this theory.
As such, it would fit in with a group of cases which do not easily fit
the breach-of-duty mold. The clearest of these are those cases which
hold that insubordination by a director-officer is per se cause for his
removal.' 43 Similarily, there are also cases involving a director-officer
acting without authority'4 4 or attempting to brihg improper pressure
See the account of the reat
521-22.
id.
sults of Vogel's program,
141 Some objective observers, such as bankers, did take this view. Id. at 441.
142 See Dyson, supra note 131, at 367-71, for a perceptive discussion of this "rule."
143 Schafer v. Thurston Mg. Co., 143 A. 613 (R.I. 1928); Freeman v. King
Pontiac Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960).
144 Smock v. Buchanan & Smock Lumber Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 308, 125 A. 115 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1928); People v. Lyon, 119 App. Div. 361, 104 N.Y.S. 319, aff'd per
curiam, 189 N.Y. 544, 82 N.E. 1130 (1907). Both of these cases involved execu140 This is apparently a very unlikely hypothesis.
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to bear upon the board by stirring up employees, customers, and suppliers.' . In none of these cases were the courts much concerned with
who was right. It was found to be enough that the ousted party stepped out of line. On the other hand, several cases have held the shareholders do not have cause to remove directors who have ousted a
president with whose policies the shareholders agreed. 146 Here the
judicial concern with enforcing the hierarchy led to a finding that the
cause was insufficient, but the same principle was operating.
These cases go beyond Lord Mansfield's dictum, since insubordination or uncooperativeness per se would not necessarily be grounds for
surcharging a director even if some harm to the corporation might
result. 47 The second hypothesis, that cause for removal exists where
the ousted official has not been a good organization man, would seem
necessary to explain them. It is notable that this hypothesis is also
roughly related to the objective of protecting the non-financial rewards accruing to the director from his position. It may seem paradoxical that any expansion of the right of removal beyond the flagrant
cases could protect the director. But the rewards of prestige and decision-making power largely depend upon the preservation of the corporate hierarchy. By protecting this hierarchy even if it means permitting the removal of the obstreperous director, the courts protect
the rewards of all directors as a class. Therefore, the interests of all
directors are furthered by sacrificing the isolated individual director
who threatens the system upon which those interests depend.148
In sum, then, cause for removal exists when the director has been
guilty of conduct which, had it led to injury to the corporation, would
warrant his being surcharged. Removal is also proper if the director
has in one way or another attempted to subvert the corporate power
structure. Clearly, both types of cause are broad enough to encompass cases requiring difficult fact-finding and delicate judgments about
the significance of those facts. In such cases, the nature of the tribunal is important. This raises the question of the extent to which
the courts defer to the findings of fact and the ultimate decisions of
the intra-corporate tribunals which are required to conduct the removal proceedings.

tives, but they were elected for a term, not appointed, thus making their status
much like a director's.
24 5 McClayton v. W.B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1946).
146 Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); State ex rel.
Koski v. Kylmanen, 178 Minn. 164, 226 N.W. 401 (1929).
147 A subordinate might well conclude that the policy was so injurious to the
corporation that the short-run injury caused by friction would be much less than
the long-run injury resulting from the pursuit of the superior's policy.
148 Cf. R. WAssmsvao,
Tm JumCIcL DEcisioN 140-48 (1961).
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B. The Intra-corporateHearing
It would be possible to permit removal only for cause and yet not
require any hearing, which is essentially the situation with regard to
the executive with a contract. 149 Or it would be possible to require
that certain procedural formalities be met, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard, without restricting the discretion of the shareholders as to the grounds upon which they are entitled to remove a
director. 50 In such a case, the requirement of a hearing would seem

to be a bit of judicial paternalism. It would give the director some
chance to present his side, even though his arguments would inevitably
fall on deaf ears, and it would guarantee the shareholders the chance
to hear both sides, even though they have their minds made up and

could care less what the director has to say.
The fact that the law contains both rules suggests that the shareholders are expected to function as an adjudicatory body and that the
various rules regarding the hearing are designed to facilitate the process of adjudication. Both the secondaries and the decisions contain
language to the effect that the shareholders are to act judicially,151 although it seems agreed that this does not necessarily mean that the
procedures must be as formal as those of a court. 52 Even more striking evidence of the fact that the requirement of legally sufficient cause
and the procedural rules are designed to interact are two cases in
which such an interaction is an integral part of the holding. In one
case, 5 3 the plaintff was removed as a director of a membership corporation which had a bylaw authorizing the board to remove one of its
members at any time with or without cause. When the plaintiff sought
reinstatement, the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the bylaw violated the statute. In the plaintiffs case his expulsion
was ostensibly for cause and, hence, the plaintiff was entitled to fair
notice and an opportunity to be heard, neither of which he received.
In other words, the court suggests that certain procedural consequences followed from the decision to remove the plaintiff for cause even
though the board was apparently free to act as arbitrarily as it liked.
On the other hand, where the corporation's bylaws permitted removal
without cause and the plaintiff was removed arbitrarily, he was not
149 See text accompanying notes 20-31 supra.
150 This appears to be the situation in England under § 184 of the Companies

Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38.
151 See, e.g., Costello v. Thomas Cusack Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 83, 124 A. 615 (Ch. 1922);
Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 434, 118 N.E.2d 590, 594 (1954) (dissenting opinion);
2 W. FixrcHm, supra note 115, at § 360.
152 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957).
'53 Norman v. Roosevelt Democratic Club, 17 Misc. 2d 219, 184 N.Y.S.2d 980

(Sup. Ct. 1959).
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entitled to complain of the lack of notice and hearing.154 These cases
seem consistent only with the view that the hearing is an adjudication
and the director's right to notice and hearing are shaped by their function of facilitating this adjudication.
Thus, the notice to the director serves as an initial pleading and
must be detailed enough to enable the director to prepare his case.
The typical vague notice of meeting sent to shareholders in American
corporations"" would not be detailed enough for these purposes. It
has been held that a simple statement that the agenda includes a vote
on the removal of a particular director is not adequate notice.' 56 Similarly, the fact that the shareholders are to act judicially implies certain things about the amount of time for preparation a director should
be given. Since an adjudicator is supposed to base his decision solely
on the evidence and not on emotional appeals,' 57 the director will need
more time to prepare than he would if emotional appeals were proper.
In some instances, the director is entitled to present evidence and witnesses' 5 s and to be represented by counsel. 5 9 The time allowed must
therefore be appropriate to preparation for trial rather than to writing
a political address.
Suppose, however, that the director is afforded all of these safeguards. What is to prevent the shareholders from ignoring what he
says? What is to prevent disingenuous fact-finding or the labeling of
perfectly innocuous behavior as incompetence 65 or honest attempts to
help as disloyalty?' 6' If there is to be some guarantee that the whole
hearing will not be a sham, there must be some judicial review of the
intra-corporate proceedings. The issue is what the scope of this review shall be. To the extent that the reviewing court defers to the
corporate tribunal, the director's protection clearly becomes less complete. Anything less than a trial de novo subjects the director to certain risks.16 2 Moreover, in certain specific cases, there is less reason
to trust the findings of the corporate tribunal, as where the director
removed was a minority representative, 6 3 or there is evidence that the
Walker v. Maas, 4 N.J. Misc. 230, 132 A. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
I 5 Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HAnv.L. REv. 1369, 1391 n.101 (1956).
IG6 In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931); Brevetti v. Tzougros, 42 Misc.
2d 171, 247 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
257 L. FULERm, THE PROBLEMIS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705-08 (temp. ed. 1949).
'54

158 Norman v. Roosevelt Democratic Club, 17 Misc. 2d 219, 184 N.Y.S.2d 980

(Sup. Ct. 1959).
15 Been v. Producers Ass'n, 352 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
160 Schafer v. Thurston Mg. Co., 143 A. 613 (R.I. 1928).
161 Walker v. Maas, 4 N.J. Misc. 230, 132 A. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
162 71 HARv. L. REV. 1154 (1958).
103 See 22 U. CHL L. REv. 751, 752-53 (1955).
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removal resolution was drafted before the meeting,:1 or there is evidence of widespread prejudice among the shareholders.
Nevertheless, if the court is to conduct a trial de novo, why bother
to hold an intra-corporate hearing in the first place? The executive
under contract can go directly to court and get an impartial hearing.
With a trial de novo the director gets that and an intra-corporate hearing too. The intra-corporate hearing takes on the aspect of a weapon
to be used by the recalcitrant director in a war of attrition against
those who seek to oust him. Since no one has suggested that the
director's enemies are entitled to get judicial review of an unsuccessful
removal attempt, it is doubtful if the hearing would be an equally
potent weapon for the other side.
There seems to be no consensus among the cases as to the proper
scope of judicial review. Some courts have conducted trials de novo
and reached their own conclusions.165 Other courts, however, have
seemingly gone to the opposite extreme and refused to review the
67
proceedings at all.166 The early English case of Inderwick v. Sne111
sums up the position of these authorities:
But the question is, whether by this deed the shareholders duly assembled

at a general meeting might not, or had not a right to, remove a director

for a cause which they thought reasonable, without its being incumbent
upon them to prove to this or any other Court of Justice that the charge

was true and the decision just, or that the case was substantiated after a
due consideration of the evidence and charge.16 8
The court decided that the shareholders had that right. In effect, these
courts are saying that removal at will is proper, and there is not much
point in talking about judicial review at all.
There are, of course, intermediate positions which might be adopted.
The courts could apply the standards used in reviewing an administrative agency16 9 or in reviewing the findings of fact of a trial judge70
If the courts were to adopt an intermediate position, it would be incumbent upon them to prescribe what sort of a record the corporate
tribunal should make. If the shareholders are all present at the hearing, so that there is no proxy literature at all, should the courts require a transcript? If the bulk of the votes are to be cast by proxy,
164 See

Riviore v. Masling, 191 La. 282, 185 So. 25 (1938).

165Petition of Korff, 198 App. Div. 553, 190 N.Y.S. 664 (1921); Eisenberg v.

Decorations, Inc., 106 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Rodless
66
1
Selley v. American Lubricator Co., 119 Iowa 591, 93 N.W. 590 (1903); Inderwick v. Snell, 2 Mac. & G. 216, 42 Eng. Rep. 83 (1850); cf. People ex rel. Stevenson

110 (1853).
v. Higgins, 15 ]1M.

167 2 Mac. & G. 216, 42 Eng. Rep. 83 (1850).
168 Id. at 222-23, 42 Eng. Rep. at 86.
169 See

generally Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence of the Whole

Record," 64 HARv. L. REv. 1233 (1951).
17oFrm. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).
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should there be any adaptations of the SEC's proxy rules to take account of the fact that the shareholders are now acting "judicially"?
In any event, the decision of the tribunal will be most like a jury verdict, with no accompanying statement of justifications. Should a general verdict be accepted or should the shareholders be required to render a special verdict?
These questions suggest that any intermediate position on the scope
of review would require the courts to face and to answer a large number of questions which have as yet seldom been asked. This is an unpalatable prospect, but the other options are to conduct a trial de novo,
which makes the hearing superfluous, or to decline to review the proceedings at all. This last approach seems the most attractive, but it
seems incompatible with the law as it presently stands. Unless the
law is changed to allow the shareholders simply to vote rather than
adjudicate, it is doubtful that any satisfactory solution can be reached.
IV.

CONCL-USION

This survey of the law regarding removal of corporate directors has
suggested that the interest being furthered by making removal difficult
is the director's personal interest in the non-financial rewards which
accrue to him by virtue of his position. The possibility of other interests being furthered seems excluded by one or more of the rules of
law in this area. Generalization from the cases defining "cause" for
removal produces definitional hypotheses which seem consistent with
the idea that it is the director's interest in the political and psychological rewards of his position which is being protected. Yet the
courts have not definitely committed themselves to making that protection as complete as possible by decreeing a trial de novo when review of an intra-corporate hearing is sought by an ousted director.
To the extent that the courts will defer to the decisions of the corporate tribunal, the removal rules become little more than traps for
the unwary; they will not protect a director against a determined,
well-counselled majority which is willing to preserve all the outward
trappings of a fair hearing. With a trial de novo, the intra-corporate
hearing becomes superfluous except as a weapon to be wielded by the
director.
It would seem that a strong case may be made for allowing shareholders to remove corporate directors at will without having to justify
their act in a court or being forced to hold a hearing. Establishing
removal at will as the basic norm certainly would not eliminate all of
the problems in this area. In states in which cumulative voting is
permitted or required, safeguards would have to be devised to prevent
a majority faction from using its removal power to oust minority repre-
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17 1

Possible conflicts with other corporate norms would
sentatives. '
also have to be resolved, 17 2 as would various problems presented by
shareholder agreements in close corporations.1 3 Nevertheless, it would
seem that a rule permitting removal at will is a better starting point
for reaching a satisfactory solution of these problems than the present
rule. Those states which already established removal at will as the
basic norm by legislation seem on sound ground.
All of this is not intended to slight in any way the interest of the
director. Many directors make substantial sacrifices when they accept
their positions; many are forced to forego subsequent opportunities.
The director is entitled to the same protection as the corporate executive. If the director or the executive is ousted arbitrarily, it may
be that he has sustained an injury for which a tort remedy is available. 7 4 Such a remedy would not depend on contract. Moreover,
making removal at will possible would probably induce directors to
get contracts from their corporations containing some guarantee of
tenure.'7 5 With such a contract, the director would be given the same
remedies as the executive has now. He would not get specific relief,
and there would be no intra-corporate hearing. The director would
thus have available the same remedies as the executive.
The Model Act resolves this conflict by prescribing:
If less than the entire board is to be removed, no one of the directors
may be removed if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient
to elect him if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board
of directors, or, if there be classes of directors, at an election of the class
of directors of which he is a part. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT § 36A
(rev. ed. 1959).
The court in Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957),
relied on the procedural safeguards and the cause requirement to protect the
minority.
172 E.g., Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch.
371, 159 A.2d 288 (Ch. 1960) (classification of board held to conflict with power
to remove at will-removal at will restricted to removal for cause).
173 See, e.g., cases cited in note 112 supra.
17,

174 In an article entitled Individual Freedom vs. Employment at Will: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, to be published in a forthcoming
issue of the Columbia Law Review, Professor Lawrence E. Blades argues persuasively that a tort theory is needed to protect legitimate employee interests
left unprotected by traditional contract theories.
175 As a practical matter, it would seem advisable to get the shareholders to
approve such contracts as an incident of electing directors; otherwise any contract made by the directors themselves might be held subject to the superior
power of the shareholders to remove at will. See Read v. Astoria Garage
(Streatham), Ltd., [1952] 1 All E.R. 922, aifd, 1 Ch. 637 (C.A.), discussed by Professor Gower in 16 Moo. L. REV. 82 (1953).

